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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are often deployed in remote and hostile environments to monitor 
the mission critical tasks. In such environments, cooperation among nodes plays a vital role for 
successful execution of protocol operations. However, node cooperation may not be guaranteed when 
malicious activities are present in the WSNs. Trust management based security has received 
considerable attention to use along with cryptography based security to improve the cooperation among 
nodes in the presence of malicious activities in the network. This paper proposes the self-adaptive trust 
model for cooperative geographic routing in WSNs. Unlike existing trust models, nodes running the 
proposed trust model systematically observe the behavior of their neighboring nodes and evaluate the 
trust values with adaptive weight assessment. The proposed method has been integrated with 
conventional Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) protocol. Further, it has been coded with 
nesC programming in TinyOS environment and evaluated on a WSN testbed consisting of 15 Telosb 
sensor nodes. The experimental results show that the proposed method significantly improved the 
packet delivery ratio in the presence of packet dropping and modification attacks.   
 
Index terms:Adaptive weights, cooperative routing, geographic routing, GPSR, nesC, security, test-
bed implementation, TinyOS, trust management. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are composed of static and/or mobile Sensor Nodes (SNs) 
that are configured with limited resources interms of processing, memory, and energy. WSNsare 
the special class of ad-hoc network. They have received considerable attention in various 
applications ranging from home automation to Internet-of-Things (IoT) [32-37].Each node in the 
network has the capability of establishing ad-hoc communication; thereby they are frequently 
utilized to set-up communication in hostile and remote environments.Nodes are more vulnerable 
to security attacks in such environments because of unattended operations,insecure wireless 
links, and lack of tamper proof bodies. An intruder can physically capture and tamper the nodes 
for converting them as malicious. These compromised nodes can disrupt the network operations 
such as routing, data aggregation, localization and others [37].  
Cryptography based security ensures the communication security; however, it cannot guarantee 
routing security [31]. It is because a node may fulfill the security requirements such as 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication; but may exhibits non-cooperation in forwarding the 
data packets.Therefore, Trust management Systems (TMSs)can be utilized in such conditions. 
TMSs compute the trust value of nodes and these values are used to improve the cooperation 
among nodes, and foridentifying and isolating malicious nodes from the network operations.Ad-
hoc networks allow the nodes to establish distributed and collaborative communication with 
other nodes. Further, communication among nodes in WSN is dynamic and malicious activities 
may appear at any time when they deploy in hostile environments.Thus, a TMS has to compute 
the trust values in a distributed fashion with thesystematic observation of node behavior [37,38]. 
To this end, this paper proposes the self-adaptive trust model for cooperative geographic routing 
in WSNs. Unlike existing trust models, nodes running the proposed trust model systematically 
observe the behavior of their neighboring nodes and evaluate the trust values with adaptive 
weight assessment. The proposed method has been integrated with conventional Greedy 
Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) protocol [27]. This integration is said to be ATM-GPSR. 
Further, it has been coded with nesC programming in TinyOS environment [28] and evaluated 
on a WSN testbed consisting of 15 Telosb sensor nodes [29]. The experimental results show that 
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the proposed method significantly improved the packet delivery ratio in the presence of packet 
dropping and modification attacks.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work. Section 
IIIdescribes the proposed self-adaptive trust model for cooperative geographic routing in WSNs. 
Section IV presents the performance evaluation of ATM-GPSR method using a WSN testbed 
consisting of 15 Telosb sensor nodes. Finally, section Vconcludes the paper with future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
a. Trust and its concepts 
Trust is an abstract concept, for which various definitions are available in the literature [5-7, 37]. 
Trust, according to [5, 37] is the subjective opinion of an entity by another entity. The trust is 
deemed as a risk factor, belief, subjective probability, and transitive relationship. The trust has 
the properties such as dynamic, reflexive, subjective, and asymmetric. Trust concepts are 
observed from social sciences and proposed models in the various fields such as social 
networking, computer networks, electronic commerce, cloud computing, and others. When TMS 
is incorporated in an entity, it assesses the trustworthiness of other entities based on interactions 
held among them. Trust of an entity will be incremented by one unit for every positive 
interaction. In the converse case, the trust value will be decremented by one unit. The TMS 
finalizes the trust to an entity for every fixed time interval called Trust Update Interval (TUI). 
The resultant trust value is quantifiedon a scale depending on the application requirement. For 
example, the authors in [6] modeled trust as a continuous value in [0, 1], in [7] the authors 
modeled the trust value as a discrete value in [-1, 1] and utilized fuzzy logic to represent trust.  
 
b. Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)  
TMS is used to assess the behavior of an entity based on sincerity in executing its intended 
services. The way of quantifying the assessed behavior by adopting the performance shown in 
executing service criteria can be modeled as a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
problem. MCD analysis is involved with structuring and solving the problem either to provide a 
solution or to reach the objective of an application. There are a number of MCDM methods are 
available in the literature [1,2,3, 8-12]. Among the available methods, a well-known method is 
the Weighted Sum Method (WSM). It is utilized in many TMS due to its simplicity and easy 
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computation. WSM is formulated using normalized weights for each criterion and normalized 
scores of all options related to each criterion. Let U be the utility function of MCDM, k be the 
number of available criteria, and then the WSM is expressed as [1-3] 
 
𝑈 =  𝑊(𝐶𝑖).𝐸 𝐶𝑖 
𝑚
𝑖=1    (1) 
 
Where, 𝐸 𝐶𝑖  is the normalized score of all possible options of the criterion i, and 
𝑊 𝐶𝑖 isnormalized weight for criterion i. There are several methods available to score the 
criterion.  
Table 1: Example of computing final value of two options 
Option Criterion 1 
(𝑊1 = 0.25) 
Criterion 2 
(𝑊1 = 0.75) 
Final value (U) 
using Eq. (1) 
1 10 6 7 
2 5 8 7.125 
 
Table 1 presents an example to illustrate the WSM. There are two service criteria: criterion 1 
 𝐶1  and criterion 2 (𝐶2) . Weights of these two service criteria are assignedas 0.25 and 0.75 
respectively. Using Eq. (1), the final value of utility function (U) for options 1 and 2 are obtained 
as 7 and 7.125. When a decision needs to be taken, then TMS prefers option 2 because of the 
high U value. In this way, the overall trust of each node is computed as the sum of the products 
of normalized weights to criteria and normalized scores of criteria. The method of normalization 
can be done in two ways [3]: relative normalization and absolute normalization. The relative 
normalization deals with scaling the score of the option such that they sum to 1. Absolute 
normalization scales the score of each criterion to fall in the range 0 and 1. The weights 
mentioned in Table 1 can be summed to 1 (i.e., 𝑊1  +  𝑊2  = 1 ). This will not scale the final 
value to 1. When the scores of the criterion are represented on the scale from 0 to 1, then the 
final values can be scaled in [0, 1]. For example, let the scores of the criterion 1 and 2 of option 1 
are 0.625 and 0.375, then the final value U is obtained using Eq. (1) as 0.4375, which is in [0, 1]. 
Various methods of assigning weights to the criterion are available in the literature [8-12]. In [8], 
the authors presented a decision matrix based approach to compute weights. The proposal in [9] 
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presented the decision-making using a kind of utility function represented in Eq. (1). A set of 
cardinal weights and ranks are utilized to represent the relative importance of criteria in [10]. 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) discussed in [11, 12] is a prominent MCDM in which a 
decision maker can assign numerical weights to the criteria. AHP divides the problem into three 
levels: 1) objective of the problem, 2) list of criteria and 3) the list of alternatives. With these 
levels, AHP involves in preparing the comparative matrix showing the relative importance of 
two criteria. This importance is scaled in the range from 1 to 9. 1 represents the equal importance 
and 9 represents extreme importance. With this matrix, an Eigen matrix consisting of normalized 
weights is computed to choose an appropriate alternative. 
Pirzada et al. [15] utilized trust concepts to secure Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) 
protocol. This is called T-GPSR protocol. T-GPSR considers the number of packets forwards 
(𝑃𝑓) and packet integrity (𝑃𝑤𝑡 ) as service criteria. When a node forwards a packet, then it turns 
the radio into the promiscuous mode in order to monitor forwarded node behavior towards 
executing these criteria. The counters 𝑃𝑓 and 𝑃𝑤𝑡 are initialized to 1 and is incremented for 
positive behavior and decremented in case of negative behavior. With these counters, the overall 
trust of neighboring nodes is computed for every Trust Update Interval (TUI). Heuristic weights 
to service criteria W(𝑃𝑓)=0.25 and W(𝑃𝑤𝑡 ) =0.75 are assigned to compute the trust of nodes. The 
trust computation is formulated as WSM and computes the trust value (T) as the sum of the 
products of weights to service criteria and counter values of service criteria (i.e.,𝑇 = 𝑊𝑃𝑓 . 𝑃𝑓  +
𝑊𝑃𝑤𝑡 .𝑃𝑤𝑡  ).  
Abu et al. [16] proposed a trust based probabilistic multipath routing to secure geographic 
routing. In this method, each node computes the trust ratings using direct observations. The trust 
value of a node for every positive observation increases by 0.01 and decreases by 0.01 for every 
negative observation. Hung et al. [17] proposed a trust model with an objective of improving the 
packet delivery and network lifetime in the presence of selfish or malicious nodes. Weights are 
associated with a packet and node’s agent. An agent can forward the packet only if it has a trust 
value greater than weight associated with the packet. The proposal in [18] evaluates the trust as a 
linear combination of direct and indirect trust. Let 𝑇𝑑  and 𝑇𝑖  be the direct and indirect trust the 
total trust (T) is computed as = 𝛼𝑑  .𝑇𝑑  +  𝛼𝑖  . 𝑇𝑖  . Where 𝛼𝑑  and 𝛼𝑖  are the fractions such that 𝛼𝑑  
+ 𝛼𝑖  =1. In addition, various trust models proposed to provide routing security [19-22].  
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However, in all these proposals the criteria weighting is a heuristic assignment. This assignment 
is purely based on the decision makers choice and do not depend on any principle or method. 
Thus, there is a need for developing amethod for adaptive weighting to service criteria. This is a 
vital requirement for dynamic systems because of unforeseen events. Static weights assignment 
is not suitable dynamic networks such as WSNs because the appearance of malicious activities 
cannot be predicted before. Nodes communicate dynamically so that a malicious node may 
communicate with its neighbors. Therefore, the TMS for WSNs should be decentralized and 
each node should involve in composing automatic weights to service criteria.  
To this end, this paper presents the self-adaptive trust model for automatic weighting method for 
trust calculation and decision making in TMS. The proposed method utilizes behavior of an 
entity as input to scoring the weights of criteria. The proposed method is an extension of the 
authors previous work reported in [30]. The inputs are application dependent. For examples, e-
learning system utilizes user traces [23]; social networking systems utilize a number of link 
clicks [24], etc. The current study considers the behavior of nodes as the primary concern in 
routing the packets from the source to the destination. Compromised nodes can exhibit selfish or 
malicious behavior and do not co-operate in therouting process. Therefore, the proposed method 
utilizes node behavior as the input.  
III. SELF-ADAPTIVE TRUST MODEL COOPERATIVE GEOGRAPHIC ROUTING  
The proposed method consists of two phases: 1) behavior scoring and 2) decision-making. Flow 
graph shown in Figure 1 depicts various stages in the proposed self-adaptive truest model. 
Criteria definition, behavior observation, criteria weighting and expectation computation is the 
part of behavior scoring phase. Trust computation and decision-making are part of the second 
phase. Both the phases are initiated for every TUI to compute the trust value. With the computed 
trust value, nodes select a neighboring node from their routing table having ahigh trust value as 
part of decision-making step. Once the trust value is computed then the same value will be used 
until TMS of a node computes fresh trust value in the next TUI. Service counters of one TUI will 
not carry forward to another TUI. It is because an old counter value is no longer useful in the 
case of network dynamics.  
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Figure 1: Flow graph of self-adaptive trust model 
a. Criteria definition  
A criterion is an event, an element, a reference, or a principle. This is used to assess, to judge, to 
estimate, or to define something related to the objective of an application. Several criteria are 
defined to address various security vulnerabilities in WSNs. The complexity in trust assessment 
will depend on the number of criteria to be observed. In order to reduce this complexity, the 
proposed method groups the criteria into their related domain. Figure 2 shows this grouping. 
These groups represent a domain of network service. The proposed method utilizes the domain 
groups such as successful packet forwards and cryptography primitives.  
 
Figure 2: Criteria grouping and monitoring 
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In addition to the existing domains, the proposed method offers extensions for some more 
domains based on the application requirement. The proposed method aims at computing 
automatic weights in the presence of any number of domains with any number of service criteria. 
The first domain  𝐷1 is related to successful packet forwards. It consists of the criteria such as 
number of packet forwards  (𝐶11 ), sincerity in network acknowledgement (𝐶12 ). Number of 
packets forwards is a criterion for checking the sincerity shown in forwarding the packets in the 
right direction towards the destination. Whereas network acknowledgement represents the 
cooperativeness shown in packet reception and providing acknowledgements. The second 
domain (𝐷2)is related to cryptography primitives. In addition to routing security, communication 
security is equally important for routing in the presence of malicious nodes in a network. 
Therefore, this domain helps in identifying the communication security related attacks. This 
domain consists of criteria such as packet integrity (𝐶21) and node authentication (𝐶22 ). Packet 
integrity deals with sincerity in forwarding a packet without modification. Authentication of a 
node is an essential criterion to prove its identity on the network.  
Predicting the behavior of a compromised node requires systematic observation of its activities 
over a period. In order to observe the behavior of a node, the proposed method maintains 
counters to record the number of successful interactions held with each domain and criterion. Let 
𝐷1 = {𝐶11 , 𝐶12 ,… , 𝐶1𝑛 } and 𝐷2 = {𝐶21 , 𝐶22 ,… , 𝐶2𝑛 } be the domains of criteria and the counters 
to record number of successful and failure interactions are represented with 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  .  and𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  .  . Where (.) represents the domain or criterion. An analogy from the social 
sciences is that trust towards an entity increases with the number of positive interactions and 
decreases with the number of negative interactions with it [26]. With this analogy, the counter 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  .  of a criterion will be incremented for every positive interaction and the counter 
𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  .  will be incremented for every negative interaction. With the obtained success and 
failure counts of criteria, domain total counts are obtained as 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑗 =  𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝐶𝑗𝑖 )
𝑛
𝑖  and 
𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑗 =  𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝐶𝑗𝑖 )
𝑛
𝑖  for j=1, 2...k.  
With the counter values, trust computation is initiated for every TUI. The trust computation is 
composed with the WSM mentioned in Eq. (1). The trust computation by the proposed method 
consists of two phases: 1) weights computation and 2) expectation computation. Since the 
objective of the proposed method is to introduce an automatic weighting in WSM, the first phase 
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deals with criteria weighting to compose normalized weights and the second phase deals with the 
computing expectation to compose a normalized score of a criterion. This criteria weighting and 
expectation computation will be performed as follows.  
b. Criteria weighting 
The TMS proposed in [15-22] utilized heuristic weights to service criteria. Such weight 
assignment can degrade the decision-making capability of TMS if multiple attacks appear in the 
network. Therefore, adaptive weighting helps in mitigating such problems. Since each attack has 
its own mechanism of criteria violation, weighting the criteria according to the node behavior 
can improve the decision capability of TMS. To do this, each node maintains a criterion counter 
table to record successes and failure counts. Table 2 shows how a node records success and 
failure of service criteria. 
Table 2: Neighbor table to record success and failure of criteria 
Neighbor ID 𝐶𝑖1 𝐶𝑖1 ---- 𝐶𝑖𝑛  
1 Success Failure --- Failure 
2 Success Success --- Failure 
-- --- --- --- --- 
n Failure Success --- Success 
 
While computing trust value of a node for every TUI, 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  .  and𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  .  of each criterion is 
computed. 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  .  is the total number of successful interactions, and 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  .  is the total 
number of unsuccessful interactions during a TUI. Table 3presents this computation. 
Table 3: Consolidated success and failure count of criteria 
 𝐶𝑖1 𝐶𝑖2 ---- 𝐶𝑖𝑛  
Success 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑖1  𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑖2  ---- 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑖𝑛   
Failure 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑖1  𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑖2  ---- 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑖𝑛   
 
The represented values in Table 3 are the consolidated values of success and failure count for 
criteria of a domain. Recursively, consolidated success and failure of all domains are calculated. 
Table 4 shows the computation of consolidated success and failure count for all domains.  
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Table 4: Consolidated success and failure count of domains 
 𝐷1 𝐷2 ---- 𝐷𝑘  
Success 
 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶1𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖
  𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶2𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖
 
---- 
 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑘𝑖  
𝑛
𝑖
 
Failure 
 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶1𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖
  𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶2𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖
 
---- 
 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑘𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖
 
 
The failure count of some domains will be very high when multiple security attacks are present 
in the network. This is because each malicious node will be having independent attack profile. 
For example, assume that there are 10 attacker nodes in a network, of which 6 are packet 
modifiers, 3 are transient behavior and 1 is a packet dropper. Each attack has its own impact on 
related domains. If heuristic weights are assigned to each domain, then there is a possibility that 
TMS may give less importance to an attack as compared to the remaining security attacks. To 
mitigate this, the proposed method adopts the success count of each domain to compute weights. 
Let 𝑊 𝐷𝑖 be the weight of a domain, it is computed using the consolidated success count values 
for all domains as  
𝑊(𝐷𝑖) =
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝐷𝑖)
 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝐷𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1
  (2) 
That means the weight of a service domain is the ratio of its success count to the sum of success 
count of all the domains considered for trust evaluation. With this, a domain with more success 
count obtains higher weight. The TMS can detect the attacks related to a service domain by 
arranging the weights in ascending order. A node will come to know about the attack by 
identifying the least weighted domain. For example, let 𝐷1 = 4 , 𝐷2 = 5 ,𝐷3 = 1be the success 
counts of the domains of a node A, then the total success count of node A is 10. Weights of 
individual domain can be obtained as 𝑊(𝐷1) = 0.4 , 𝑊(𝐷2) = 0.5, and 𝑊(𝐷3) = 0.1 (using Eq. 
(2)). In this way, a domain with high success count will obtain higher weight. By arranging the 
weights in ascending order, i.e., {𝑊(𝐷3) = 0.1,𝑊(𝐷1) = 0.4,𝑊(𝐷2) = 0.5}, an observer node 
can easily identify the attacks posed by node A. Since security attack related domains results into 
lower value, it can be interpreted from the arrangement that the node A is performing attacks 
related to 𝐷3 . 
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c. Expectation computation 
TMS of a node composes the expectation of the neighboring nodes by recording success and 
failures in fulfilling the criteria. This record helps in assessing neighboring nodes behavior in 
fulfilling a criterion. These records are analyzed for every TUI. The main difference between 
weight assessment and expectation computation is that weight computation is the performance of 
neighboring nodes in fulfilling all the domains. Where, the expectation computation is the 
performance of a neighboring node in fulfilling a specific domain. The result of trust 
computation can be more useful when theperformance of nodes toward all service domains for 
the performance towards a particular domain is adopted. The proposed method utilizes Beta 
distribution to compute the performance towards a domain. This distribution is widely known for 
its simplicity and sound statistical theory. A number of trust models in various fields have 
adopted this distribution for trust composition [25]. Using the success and failure counts of the 
domain the expectation 𝐸(𝐷𝑖)is calculatedusingEq. (3) as 
𝐸 𝐷𝑖 =
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑖 +1
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑖 +𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑖 +2
  (3) 
Using Eq. (3), the expectation of nodes towards a domain is computed. The expectation 
𝐸 𝐷𝑖 becomes 0.5 when there is no success and failure count values. It indicates that nodes are 
benevolent towards fulfilling the domain criteria. If the value falls below 0.5, then malicious 
activity can be suspected. Otherwise, TMS can decide that the neighboring nodes are cooperative 
in routing process.  
d. Trust calculation 
The trust of a node 𝑁𝑗 , 𝑇(𝑁𝑗 ), is computed with weights and expectation value for every TUI 
using WSM. It is by plugging Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) to (1) as 
𝑇 𝑁𝑖 =  𝑊(𝐷𝑖).𝐸 𝐷𝑖 
𝑘
𝑖=1    (4) 
 
Algorithm 1 presents the procedure of trust value calculation. 
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Algorithm 1: Trust value calculation in self-adaptive trust model 
Input Success and Failure count of criteria and domains 
Output Trust value 
Initialization Initialize the trust value of each node to 0.5 
  
Step 1 Set/ Reset Trust Update Interval (TUI). 
  
Step 2 If a data packet has to be forwarded, then store it in 
thebuffer and select a trusted neighbor from neighbor 
table to forward the packet. 
  
Step 3 Switch to promiscuous mode and observe the forwarded 
node behavior for trust metrics such as packet forwards, 
packet integrity maintaining, acknowledgments, etc. 
  
Step 4 Record the 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡   and𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  of each criterion. 
  
Step 5 If TUI reached thengo to step 6 else go to step 2. 
  
Step 6 Compute weights using Eq.(2). 
Compute expectation using Eq.(3). 
Compute trust value using Eq. (4). 
  
Step 7 If the trust valueis computed, go to Step 1. 
 
Initially, all the weights and expectations are set to 0.5. For example, during the initial stage of 
the network, weights of each domain are set to 0.5 by assuming that there is no routing or 
communication takes place. Then, the success and failure counts of a node towards a domain are 
0. With Eq. (3), the expectation of the domain is obtained as 0.5. By placing these values in Eq. 
(4), the total trust value of a node is obtained as 0.5 (i.e., 0.5x0.5+0.5x0.5 = 0.5). This shows the 
equal priority to each node in the network. This is because the malicious activities can be 
expected after some time from the beginning of the network operations. With this initialization, 
as the number of malicious activities increases, the proposed method automatically composes the 
weights and expectation of the service domain.  
e. Decision making  
The proposed self-adaptive trust model is used along with Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing 
(GPSR) protocol. GPSR protocol works in two modes: Greedy mode and perimeter mode. In 
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theGreedy mode, an efficient path will be identified to reach thedestination. In perimeter mode, 
the routes are identified along the perimeter of the region. This mode is used when greedy mode 
fails to find a path towards the destination. The calculated trust value is used along with the 
routing process to make efficient routing decisions. Nodes having trust value less than 0.5 are 
discarded from the forwarding set before deciding the next node to forward the packets. With 
this, nodes with benign behavior are elected to forward the packets. Finally, a neighbor node 
having the highest trust value with a smaller distance to the destination will be selected to 
forward the packet.  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
a. Experimental setup 
Table 4: Experimental parameters 
Number of nodes 15 
Transmit power level 3 
Experiment time 30 minutes 
Packet size 28 bytes 
Max. Malicious nodes 5 
Data packet rate 1 packet per 2 seconds 
Beacon packet rate 1 packet per 5 seconds 
TUI 10 seconds 
Security attacks Black hole and Gray hole 
Examined protocols GPSR and ATM-GPSR 
 
The direct trust module of GTM and greedy mode of the GPSR protocol is coded using 
nesCprogramming in TinyOSenvironment [28] to verify their performance on the real WSN 
testbed. The experiment is conducted by using a static network of 15 Telosb [29] sensor nodes in 
an indoor environment. Telosbnode works in various power levels ranging from 1 to 31. Power 
level 1 equals to -25dBm and power level 31 equals to 0dBm. In this experiment, nodes are set at 
power level 3. It is done by initializationof the flag DCC2420_DEF_RFPOWER to 3.  
The proposed self-adaptive trust model and GPSR protocol are coded in nesC programming. 
This component is named as GpsrC. Figure 3 shows the wiring diagram of the GpsrC component 
that has been coded in nesC programming. Active Message library of TinyOS environment has 
been used for coding the message transmission related operations [28]. The source node senses 
the temperature and sends the sensor data along with the data packets to the destination. The 
location data for each node have been manually loaded at the time of network deployment.  
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Figure 3: Wiring diagram of GpsrC component coded in nesC programming 
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Figure 4: Snapshot of the experimental setup 
 
 
Figure 5: Grid topology 
The snapshot of the experimental setup is shown in Figure 4. Nodes are placed in a 3 x 5 grid as 
shown in Figure5. The edge between two nodes represents the bidirectional link. Parameters 
considered for the experiment is presented in Table4. 
Node 15 is considered as the source node that transmits the data packet to the destination node 1 
every 2 seconds. Two security attacks such as the black hole and gray hole attacks are considered 
between source and destination to analyze the performance of GPSR and ATM-GPSR. Black 
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hole nodes drop all the data packets that they receive. Gray hole nodes selectively drop and 
forward the data packets that they receive. In addition, they also modify the integrity of the data 
packets. Two trust metrics such as sincerity in forwarding the packet and sincerity in maintaining 
packet integrity are considered for trust value calculation. A maximum of 5 nodes in the path 
between source and destination is considered as malicious nodes. The performance of GPSR and 
ATM-GPSR in the presence of malicious nodes is evaluated using two network performance 
metrics: 1) packet delivery – it is the number of data packets received by the destination to the 
number of data packets sent by the sender, and 2) the average number of hops traveled by the 
data packets between the source and destination.  
b. Results analysis 
 
Figure 6: Packet delivery for GPSR and ATM-GPSR in the presence of black hole nodes 
Figure 6 shows the packet delivery of GPSR and ATM-GPSR in the presence of black hole 
nodes. It is observed from the figure that the packet delivery of GPSR is degraded as the number 
of black nodes increases. It is due to the absence of trust model in GPSR. However, due to the 
presence of trust calculation in ATM-GPSR, it is able to detect black hole nodes and routed the 
packets through trusted paths. Hence, packet delivery remains above 93% in the case of ATM-
GPSR in the presence of a maximum of 5 black hole nodes. 
Figure 7 shows the packet delivery of GPSR and ATM-GPSR in the presence of gray hole nodes. 
Due to features such as trust metrics observation and trust calculation in ATM-GPSR, it is able 
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to identify malicious activities such as packet header modification and packet dropping. This 
results in higher packet delivery in the presence of gray hole nodes in the network when ATM-
GPSR is employed than when GPSR is used. It is observed from the figure that packet delivery is 
observed above 95% in the case of ATM-GPSR. 
 
Figure 7: Packet delivery for GPSR and ATM-GPSR in the presence of gray hole nodes 
 
 
Figure 8: Average hop count of GPSR and ATM-GPSR in the presence of black hole nodes 
Packet delivery of nodes that are far from the destination is greatly degraded when malicious 
nodes are present in the path. It is due to the packet dropping and changing the packet header 
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information by the malicious nodes in the routing path. When trust model is used with the 
routing protocols, it helps in dynamic detection and isolation of malicious nodes from the routing 
paths. Therefore, routing protocol searches for alternative paths to bypass the malicious nodes. 
Therefore, when malicious nodes are present in the shortest paths, the packets may be forwarded 
via lengthy paths and hence the number of hops traveled by packets may increase. 
 
Figure 9: Average hop count of GPSR and ATM-GPSR in the presence of grayhole nodes 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 that there is degradation in hop count when GPSR is employed. Due to the 
absence of trust calculation, nodes running GPSR are unable to detect malicious nodes and hence 
they are not choosing the alternative paths. The ATM-GPSR is effectively detecting various 
attacks with the calculated trust values and routes the packets towards trustworthy nodes. The 
hop count in the case of ATM-GPSR is more than that in thecase of GPSR and recorded 
consistent average hop count as compared to GPSR. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Node cooperation is a predominant requirement when WSNs are operated in remote and hostile 
environments. To achieve this, a self-adaptive trust model for cooperative geographic routing in 
WSN has been proposed in this paper. Unlike existing trust models, nodes running the proposed 
trust model systematically observe the behavior of their neighboring nodes and evaluate the trust 
values with adaptive weight assessment. The proposed method has been integrated with 
conventional GPSR protocol. Further, it has been coded with nesC programming in TinyOS 
environment and evaluated on a WSN testbed consisting of 15 Telosb sensor nodes. The 
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experimental results show that the proposed method significantly improved the packet delivery 
ratio in the presence of packet dropping and modification attacks.  As a future work, we attempt 
to extend the proposed trust model to detect other security attacks such as Sybil and Wormhole.  
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